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Introduction 
Since the Maastricht treaty was agreed and entered into force in 1993 there has been a 
flurry of activity in the field of employee participation at the European level. Much of 
this activity has been the completion of unfinished business left over from previous 
attempts at directives, some of which stretch back into the 1970’s. (EIRO, 2002) 
This chapter will look at three main initiatives that have such a history and have been 
enacted since 1993 – namely the European Works Council Directive (hereafter EWC), 
the European Company Statute (ECS) and the more recent Information and 
Consultation of Employees Directive (ICE).  All three of these directives represent 
important and major boosts for employee participation within Europe and the UK in 
particular.  Indeed if we were to believe some of the hype surrounding the EWC and 
ICE introduction we are witnessing the advent of a truly European form of employee 
representation and participation.  For some (Lecher, et al, 1999, 2002 & 2002) the 
three directives together make it possible to talk of a robust European model of 
participation backed by a platform of employee rights that begin to transcend the 
parochical national models and usher in institutions on a European scale: 
 
“In many member states  (the directives)…. represents the essential, and in 
some cases, the sole foundations for the employees rights to information and 
consultation, filling a gap in the law and paving the way for a higher degree of 
harmonisation of labour and industrial relations legislation in Europe”.   (ETUI 
2007: 83) 
 
For the UK it is claimed that these directives together represent a potential sea-change 
in British industrial relations, for the first time there are legal rights to workplace 
consultation, there is the implantation of the Works Council model and the option 
through the ECS to adopt board level employee representation. For Keller (2002), and 
the ETUI, (2007) this presages a move from away from the voluntaristic tradition 
towards adoption of  a ‘Continental model’: 
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“Insofar as the directive establishes a permanent structure worker 
representation throughout Europe, it constitutes a step in the definition of a 
continental model of labour relations within Europe, thereby entailing 
immediate impact on countries with a voluntaristic tradition such as the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and Malta. “ (ETUI 2007: 83) 
 
Keller sees the three directives together addressing the thorny issue of divergent 
employee representation and the gaps that they have in practice; each of the different 
directives addresses differing levels for worker representation and participation.  
EWC and ICE deals with the enterprise issues relating to tactical and operational 
management dealt with by lower representation, whilst the ECS provides for higher 
level representation allowing access to those strategic decision-making functions of 
European-scale enterprises. Bercusson (2002) when discussing the ICE directive 
writes of the ‘European Social Model coming to Britain’ as its necessary processes 
will have profound implications for the structure of employee representation.  Kluge 
(2004) in a similar fashion sees the past decade as a decisive one in the formation of a 
truly Social Europe: 
“At the European level an additional reference system for a Europeanisation of 
labour relations involving the active inclusion of employees has been added to 
social dialogue in the last ten years with the three directives explicitly 
concerning workers’ involvement ….. In the first place they set Europe-wide 
standards for the inclusion of employees, information and consultation as a 
codified European standard with consequences for national labour systems, and 
additional participation in cross-border companies and cooperatives. This 
represents an achievement for Social Europe.”  (Kluge. 2004:5 )  
 
This chapter then will look in turn at each of these major directives to assess the 
substance of employee participation that they contain and identify if they are leading 
to substantive change contributing to a growing Europeanisation of participative 
structures.  Equally important is the need to review available evidence on the 
importance and outcome of the three directives to assess the reality of such 
participation.  This latter poses more difficulties as in the case of the SE and ICE 
directives their enactment is fairly recent and therefore the corporate and institutional 
impact is less embedded than for the EWC.  
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European Works Council Directive. 
If the debate on Europeanisation of representation and participation is correct then the 
EWC Directive has a key role to play in the unfolding of that process, Lecher et al 
(1999) accord the directive much more importance than the macro social dialogue 
when it comes to the development of European participative structures, in many 
respects they paint a very determinist path towards this Social Europe,: 
 
“actors have no choice but to widen their radius of action to international and 
supra-national level .…. as a consequence EWCs could prove to be more 
important in establishing the foundations of an enduring system of European 
industrial relations than the ‘compensatory’ Social Dialogue between 
umbrella organisation.” (1999: 3) 
 
Waddington (2003) points to a somewhat different outcome.  Optimistically one 
might see greater cross-border fertilisation and the growth of activity at the 
transnational level emanating from an adoption of the continental model.  However, 
he equally sees cause for pessimism due to the fact that employers can effectively opt 
out of setting up councils and even where they are created he sees regulation as neo- 
voluntaristic at best. (2003, pp 304-5) 
This chapter is not the place to look at the long and chequered history of the directive  
prior to enactment in 1994 see Falkner (1998) for that account.  Briefly, previous 
attempts to get some form of consultation process were evident as early as the 1960s. 
Subsequently the Vredeling Proposal, or to give its official title the Draft Directive on 
Procedures for Informing and Consulting Employees, first  put  forward  in  1980.  
This directive was  specifically  drawn   up  to  establish  procedures  for enhanced 
consultation and information inside large multi-plant, and especially, multi-national 
enterprises. The period following the Maastricht Treaty saw intense debate between 
the social partners to define the provisions of transnational information and 
consultation arrangements. (see Waddington, 2003,  Lecher et al. 1999,  Hall , 1992)  
In 1991 the Commission launched a draft directive for works councils covering 
Community scale undertakings. The exchanges between the ETUC and UNICE saw 
the latter succeed in ensuring that the Directive excluded codetermination rights, 
rejected a formal role for trade union representatives and prioritised ‘voluntary’ 
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provisions.  The employers also managed to raise the employment thresholds for 
undertakings included in the Directive (Falkner, 1998: 102–12). 
 
The directive that came into force in 1994 did not invent EWCs as there were a 
number of voluntary councils in existence prior to that, however its statutory 
imperative did usher in a period of unprecedented growth and debate on the issue of 
transnational consultation. There is now over twelve years of EWC experience to 
draw on and this can enable one to take stock of its impact.  We can ask what has 
been the main lessons for worker participation from the advent of this directive,  what 
is the impact on decision-making, how is the impact being felt by the actors in the 
process and to what extent are the ‘optimists’ vindicated in their expectations of 
EWCs?  I will first to look at the figures and the compliance rates before going onto 
discuss the impact upon worker influence in decision making.  
 
In September 1994 when the EWC Directive was adopted, 46 companies had already 
voluntarily established EWCs, (Gold and Hall, 1992, 1994 provide an account of the 
pre-legislative EWCs), whereas by 2007 some  972 EWCs had been created and 
approximately 820 still had an existence in that year; mergers, closures and 
restructuring account for  the difference between the two figures. The ETUI research 
group on EWCs provide the most comprehensive and up to date figures that show the 
overall rate of eligibility, creation and compliance rates as follows. 
 
Growth of EWC’s  
   1995    1998       2000 2002      2004        2006    2007  
 
Eligible  1152        1205       1848         1874         2169        2204         2257 
 
Actual     49             329        606          678           737           772    822 
 
Compliance                   4%        27%        33%        36%        34%         35%       36%   
(Source ETUI-REHS, April 2007)  
 
Looking across the various countries affected by the directive now, we see the highest 
complier to be Belgium at 52%, with the UK and USA high (42% and 36% 
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respectively). Germany the country with the most ‘community scale enterprises (over 
250) has a modest compliance rate of 28%, whilst Spain and Portugal have the lowest 
rates at 16% and 12%. Looking at the figures for longevity nearly half of the EWC’s 
have been in existence for 10 years. 
               
Much of the research evidence one can draw upon stresses the variety and diversity of 
the EWCS and how country of origin effects lead to differentiation in terms of format, 
structure, personnel, frequency of meetings and employee influence.  Lecher et al’s 
three volume study described this heterogeneity with a fourfold typology of EWCs  – 
Symbolic, Service, Project-oriented and Participative. Only the latter is held up as the 
potential forerunner for a Europeanised industrial relations where the councils have 
scope for negotiations, have cohesive internal structures, strong European 
links/exchanges and a supportive trade union structure. However, again we are told 
that only two of their 15 case study councils fulfil this classification and that ‘many 
EWCs have not yet realised their potential… and several will not be able to do so over 
the longer term’ (2001, Vol 2, p93) When they look at the content of EWC 
proceedings again there is little optimism that EWCs are developing a wider role than 
that specified in the Directive. The hope that these forums are precursors to European 
collective bargaining is hardly borne out. In the vast majority of their cases they share 
the analysis offered by Carley and Marginson (2000) that the function of the Councils 
do not extend beyond information disclosure; indeed negotiation is expressly 
forbidden in 10% of the cases they report. Other research reported by Mark Hall 
shows that only 2% of agreements allowed for negotiations on certain issues and only 
4% of the EWC’s could make recommendations and proposals of its own. More 
recent work by Leonard et al (2007) indicates that both cross-border bargaining 
initiatives and movements to transcend consultation have failed to happen in the vast 
majority of EWCs.   Whilst Europeanisation and globalisation of business exerts 
greater pressure to move this way, the agenda appears to be restricted by internal 
management and the decisions they make about the extent of transnational 
consultation, “overall management remains the driving force behind the emergence of 
a cross-border dimension to company bargaining” (Leonard et al, 2007, p 62). In 
terms of negotiated texts and agreements little appears to have changed since Hall’s 
earlier work, evidence using 2005 data shows 53 joint texts in 32 trans-national 
companies representing just over 4% of the total; closer inspection however shows 
 5
that 31 of the agreements emanated from just 10 companies the existence of a joint 
text did not automatically mean that bargaining of significance was taking place. 
(Leonard et al 2007: 63) 
Part of the reason given for the lack of coherence and vitality within EWCs relates to 
ill-fitting and contrasting employee representational structures and the difficulty of 
them “making the leap from the local to the European level” (Lecher et al, Vol 3, p 
169).  This repeats Hyman’s (2001) analysis regarding the national rootedness of 
labour institutions when compared with the internationalisation of capital; and the 
importance for collective bargaining at the local level where the crucial issues 
surrounding the effort bargain and work organisation are primarily decided.  
Waddington’s (2003) survey of 558 EWC participants within 222 MNCs provides 
cogent evidence to back up the diversity thesis. The survey finds that no single path 
of development is privileged – indeed the evidence underlines the effects of the 
contrasting three models of industrial relations, [Waddington describes the first as 
Voluntaristic, then Juridicial and finally Coordinated Bargaining 2003:307] and the 
consequent panoply of procedural and structural arrangements. The survey looks 
more qualitatively at the depth of the information and consultation on offer, its 
timing, its usefulness, appropriateness and the genuineness of the consultative 
process. Here certain deficiencies regarding the reality of participation are exposed, 
important issues that should have been included within the council's remit did not 
seem to be the subject of information and consultation. Items that have been central to 
European and national trade union actors were unlikely to appear on the EWC 
agendas, exceptions to this being items related to health and safety and  
environmental protection. 
 
“the issue of trade union rights, was reported as not raised by almost three 
quarters of EWC representative, suggesting that there has been only limited 
progress in developing the EWC - trade union links - even though Euro-optimists 
considered this linkage central to the future development of EWCs.”  
(Waddington 2003: 313) 
 
Indeed, the flexibility written into the constitution of EWCs has, to Waddington's 
mind, allowed management to exert undue influence on the agenda.  This echoes 
work done by Hancké (2000) on European Works Councils in the automotive sector. 
Here the EWCs signally failed to halt competitive restructuring and had not enabled 
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better or more cooperative union interchange on vital issues such as job losses and 
changes to working conditions: 
“ European works councils have failed to become a pan-European vehicle for 
trade union coordination, as optimists had hoped,  precisely when this was most 
needed …….. Not only are European works councils, relatively unimportant in 
building up international trade union strength; local trade unionists seem to use 
the European works councils to do the opposite: obtain information that can be 
used in the competition for  productive capacity with other plants in the same 
company.“  ( Hancke 2000: 55) 
 
Whilst EWCs are important because of their potentiality to strengthen employees and 
trade unions legal rights to get information and to be consulted, that potential has yet, 
it seems, to be fully realised. The trade unions and worker representatives might be 
treated as legitimate groups in the process of enterprise consultation model but myriad 
institutional and attitudinal problems interpose themselves to prevent a healthy 
consensus developing. From the available evidence the EWC process has not proved 
to be the watershed in terms of the representation of staff, nor in the forging of new 
and powerful relationships with overseas trade unions that establish real rights to 
consult and bargain on a transnational basis. On the basis of Swedish case study 
evidence, Huzzard and Docherty (2005) neatly encapsulate this disappointment when 
they say: 
“although EWCs appear to provide useful opportunities for transnational trade 
union networking, these cases indicate that they do not function as a means for 
labour to significantly check the power of multinational capital. From a critical 
perspective, the EWCs can plausibly be seen as a management tool for 
legitimizing and facilitating rationalization and restructuring in manufacturing 
and as a tool for ‘engineering’ corporate culture in services (including 
retailing). There is little evidence, moreover, to suggest the evolution of 
transnational bargaining structures through EWCs or the integration of EWC 
procedures into either formal corporate or HR decision-making.” (2005: 543) 
 
Employee involvement in the European Company 
In similar fashion to the EWC Directive the debate on the European Company has 
more than a 40 years history. (Gold & Schwimbersky. 2008) The topic was first 
discussed in the early 1960s but it was in 1965 when the idea was formalised by the 
French government who proposed in a note to set-up legislation on a European 
Company through a treaty between the EC Member States. (Lenoir, 2007 puts the first 
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mention of this even earlier in discussions that pre-dated the setting up of the EEC)  
The Commission published a first proposal on the statute for a European Company in 
1970 with an obligatory two-tier structure of a Societie Europeanne (SE) an 
administrative and supervisory board on which the representation of employees could 
be acheived. In that proposal there was also a provision for concluding (European) 
collective agreements on working conditions in the SE between the management and 
the represented trade unions. (SEEurope Network, 2007) The deadlock of 25 years 
that followed this was finally overcome when the Commission convened a ‘high level 
expert group on workers involvement’, the so called Davignon Group (1997). They 
concluded in their final report that the national systems on workers’ involvement were 
too diverse, the report proposed instead that priority should be given  “to a negotiated 
solution tailored to cultural differences and taking account of the diversity of 
situations” (Davignon Report 1997: Paragraph 94c)and importantly they suggested a 
default arrangement that if negotiations failed then standard rules should apply. At the 
EU Council in Nice (2000) the Regulation on the ECS and the Directive on workers' 
involvement in the SE were finally adopted and the Directive was enacted in October 
2001. The latter prescribes prior negotiations on information, consultation 
arrangements and (board level) participation.  This to be undertaken by the competent 
managerial actors within the participating companies and a Special Negotiating Body 
(composed by employees' representatives from the different countries involved). 
Negotiations come to an end six months after the first meeting of the SNB (renewable 
once). Negotiations can result in a number of possible outcomes:  
• a written agreement is indeed concluded at this time and the registered SE 
incorporates the social dimension in this agreement;  
• the SNB decides on the contrary (by a two-thirds majority) to conclude 
negotiations before the end of this period, or even not to begin negotiations, 
deeming the system of worker involvement organised by national legislation 
or by framework agreements concerning the group on a national scale to be 
satisfactory;   
• negotiations are unsuccessful and the subsidiary rules of the 2001 directive, 
referred to as “standard” are therefore adopted. ( Lenoir 2007: 64) 
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Once again flexibility to appease differing social models was introduced that gave 
member states the possibility not to apply the standard rules for (board level) 
participation in the case of an SE inauguration following a merger, this “opt-out-
clause” was introduced following robust demands by Spain (Keller, 2002) supported 
by the UK government amongst others. The timetable for transposition was agreed as 
October 2004 and so far 25 of the 27 countries achieved this prior to 2007 with 
Bulgaria and Romania doing so during that year.  
 
One of the important elements that the SE addresses is the very definition of  what 
employee participation is and how it can be differentiated, whilst the EWC has 
information and consultation rights built in, the SE goes further and offers specific 
distinctions between the corporate provision of  information and consultation and 
participation: 
 “involvement …..according to the 2001 directive, (is) “any… mechanism through 
which employees may exercise an influence on decisions to be taken within the 
company”. Information and consultation refer to identified social laws that are 
the subject of European harmonisation” (Lenoir,  2007:  63) 
 
However following the discussion within the Davignon group, participation is 
something more: 
“the 2001 directive defines participation as the right to recommend or oppose the 
appointment of members to the supervisory or administrative boards, or as the 
right to elect or appoint these representatives. Reference is made here to the 
highest level of participation, since all members of the supervisory or 
administrative board – elected, appointed or recommended by the employees’ 
representatives – are full members. They have the right to vote, contrary to the 
provisions of the French Labour Code for representatives of Work Councils called 
upon to participate in these councils in an advisory role.” (Ibid: 63)  
 
Keller (2002) in his detailed dissection of the SE provisions stresses that the essential 
importance of this move lies in its potential for extending both the scope and the 
levels of participation.  European enterprises may now have trade union 
representation and Works Councils providing information, consultation and 
negotiation at the workplace or plant level now this can be supplemented by genuine 
employee participation in board level decision making.  This point is echoed by Gold 
and Schwimbersky: 
“The Directive governs provisions for two levels of transnational employee 
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representation within the SE: employee information and consultation through a 
‘representative body’ (or equivalent procedures) and arrangements for board-
level representation, referred to as ‘participation’ with safeguards to prevent the 
dilution or abolition of existing systems” (Gold & Schwimbersky 2008: 56) 
 
 
These multiple formats allow for the first time across the EU the potential for 
coordinated and influential structures of participation. However, Keller also warns us 
to look at the past practice and the possible set of constraints that will shape actual 
decision-making inside the new enterprises.  Because the formation of a European 
Company – or SE – remains purely voluntary and supplementary to national forms of 
company legislation this does have important effects and these for Keller could 
constrain the take-up of  SEs;  
 
 “ voluntary participation arrangements are of a different quality than obligatory 
ones, as firms enter into them only if they promise to be pro-competitive” (Keller 
2002: 441) 
 
Only the ‘before and after principle’ which guarantees the acquired rights of workers 
to participation in the European company to ensure that they are never eroded or 
eliminated as a result of its creation (Blanquet, 2002. quoted in Gold & 
Schwimbersky: 55) means that countries with existing strong participation provisions 
(such as Germany) are restricted in their options.  
 
There are now over three years of SE development to draw upon and we can use this 
to tentatively estimate to what extent Keller is right in his prediction of involvement 
being dependent upon market dependent management strategies resulting in a low 
level of compliance.  
 
Outcomes so far 
According to April 2007 data, seventy SEs had been created across Europe and 
another thirteen are in the process of being created.  One can see from table X that the 
vast bulk of these SEs are based in Germany, Austria and Benelux (49) with the 
majority of those in the planning stage also headquartered there. Since the Directive 
was enacted in 2004 many States have delayed incorporating the SE statute into their 
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national law (Lenoir 2007: 85) and this explains both the low figures and the absence 
of some key member states,  notably Italy, Spain and Poland. 
 
 
European Companies: Established and Planned 
 
Ger    Aut Neth    Bel   Swe   Fra   UK   Hun   Nor   Lat   Est    Slo    Lux    Fin    Cyp 
26        8          6           7        5        2       3       2        2        2       1       2        2        1        1 
 4         -           -          -          1        2        -       -        -         -        1       -        -         -         - 
 Those in italics are in planning (Source Seeuropenetwork.org. 2007) 
 
When one looks at the numbers of employees covered by the new structures they 
are somewhat meagre, the database records just over 176,000 employees in the 
established SEs and just seven of those account for 175,000 staff.  The corollary of 
this is that ten SEs report workforce numbers to be below 350 employees, we see 
twenty four established SE’s report zero employees and there a further thirty that do 
not give any employee information at all. With only three years of legal existence 
there is scant evidence about the likely trajectory of growth of the SEs, the 
Seeurope database has tried to collect figures for potential SEs, and if these were 
factored in we could see coverage of staff more than double by 2008. Of the eight 
SEs in development half are German, two French, one Swedish ands one Estonian. 
Overall this will extend SEs to an extra 350,000 workers  as three of the companies 
are very large employers – BASF (German), Fresenius (German) and Suez (French) 
between the three of them they account for 345,000 of the total.   The two German 
companies are planning to have information, consultation and participation 
arrangements.  
 
Hence the ETUI designates only twelve SEs as ‘normal’,1 the others are seen as 
shelf or empty companies that have either no employees or in some cases no 
operations and exist on a ‘just in case’ basis. It is only in those SEs designated 
‘normal’ that we can ascertain whether the fuller participative mechanisms apply.  
In the twelve cases there are four where there is both information/consultation 
instruments and ‘participation’ at the board level; in seven cases there are 
information/consultation mechanisms alone and one has neither 
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information/consultation nor ‘participation’. Of the four SEs with employee 
participation on the board two are German and the other two are Austrian, 
representing countries with pre-existing legislation on board participation. Looking 
more closely at the actual provision of employee representation Allianz the German 
insurance giant gives 50% of the seats to worker delegates as does the other 
German enterprise MAN Diesel.  Strabag an Austrian construction company 
provides for one third representation whilst Plansee an Austrian metal working firm 
moved to a single board structure and actually increased worker representation on 
that board from 33% to 40%.  
 
On the basis of these rather modest achievements the ETUI states that: 
 
“The worker side can be rather satisfied with the results……in none of the 
companies where participation rights existed before has the percentage of  
employee delegates amongst the board members been reduced.”  (ETUI 
2007: 93) 
 
I find this statement perplexing, premature and rather negative: based as it is on 
such small numbers and secondly in celebrating the mere retention of employee 
rights to board-level representation in a small number of European enterprises that 
have a ‘continental format’ already in place. Looking critically at the situation one 
might conclude that European industry and commerce see little positive value in 
SEs and because of this their importance in participation terms will be either 
symbolic or marginal. Keller is particularly critical of the weakness of the 
participation that this directive ushers in.  Not just that  in the vast majority range of 
member states there is little evidence that the SE format will be adopted by 
enterprises now or in the future; but also that the ‘power relationship’ that currently 
exists across Europe ‘will not be seriously challenged by SEs’. (Keller 2002: 442) 
Future compliance may indeed change but so far it does look like Keller’s 
pessimism about the prospects for enhanced and European scale ‘participation’ was 
well-founded.  
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Information and Consultation Directive  
 
During the 1990s, Europe saw numerous high profile closures of businesses in 
different EU countries.  At the same time there had been clamour by various social 
actors to do something about the issue of redundancies related to social dumping 
within the EU.  The Hoover closure in Scotland in 1993 and the 1998 Renault closure 
of its Vilvoorde plant in Belgium catapulted these debates on to the European scene 
with frantic activity between the peak organisations to address and mitigate the 
impacts of such incidents. The Hoover case sped on the enactment of the EWC 
directive that sought to enable employee consultation in transnational organisations. 
In 1995 talks began between the social partners on a community instrument on 
domestic consultation and information procedures. The Vilvoorde closure highlighted 
the significant weaknesses within the consultative practices inside EU countries when 
important and substantial issues affecting employees were decided. Following the 
failure of the European level social actors to deal with this issue through the 
‘negotiation track’ (see Carley this volume) a proposal for a Council Directive 
establishing a general framework for informing and consulting employees was 
proposed by the Commission. This framework did not simply concentrate upon 
harmonisation of national law but sought ‘essential changes to the existing legal 
framework ... appropriate for the new European context’ (Bercusson, 2002, 217) For 
the UK and Ireland where there was no prior legislation this signalled a more 
fundamental departure than elsewhere in continental Europe. 
 
“The ICE regulations represent a radical development in the UK context.  
Historically, employee consultation has not generally been regulated by the law in 
the UK reflecting its voluntaristic industrial relations tradition.  “ (Hall 2005: 
104) 
 
Both Bercussen (2002) and Hall (2005) indicate that the UK government took a 
particularly negative stance regarding the introduction of this directive.  The UK 
sought to oppose any proposal that would cut across existing practices and would 
harm the traditional format of employee relations in the UK.  During a period of 
consultation, the UK managed to water down the draft in two key areas.  The first was 
excising the need for information and consultation prior to a decision being taken, the 
second being the watering down of sanctions in the event that management violated 
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the requirements. (Hall 2005:108) Employer lobbying also gained a longer 
introduction time for the Directive and the phased process whereby the only firms 
above 150 employees would be immediately affected followed by firms with 100+ in 
2007 and 50+ in 2008.  Official data (DTI, 2004) showed that in the UK approaching 
37,000 enterprises would meet the Regulations’ employment thresholds.  
 
“There are around 13,000 enterprises with 150 or more full-time equivalent 
employees and some 5,700 enterprises with 100–149 employees. Enterprises 
with 50–99 employees are the largest group covered by the Regulations: 
almost 18,000 enterprises fall within this category, constituting nearly half of 
all enterprises with 50 or more employees. “ (Hall 2005: 119) 
 
About 75 per cent of UK employees will ultimately be covered by the Regulations.  
 
From the time that the UK government signalled its intent to transpose the directive 
UK companies have had to consider how they comply with the legal requirements and 
provide acceptable ‘information and consultation’ rights. They can be forced to act if 
a 10% vote of the workforce triggers negotiations so that an ‘Information and 
Consultation’ arrangement has to be made.    Once a vote is triggered the employer 
can then establish an arrangement covering all employees at the workplace or the 
request may go to a ballot of employees. If a ballot is called, then a 40 per cent plus 
majority of those voting must endorse the request. If successful, the employer is 
obliged to reach a negotiated agreement with employee representatives. As Bercusson 
(2002) indicates where 10% of employees make such request then the employer must 
implement the ‘standard provisions’ of legislation if negotiations to reach an 
agreement fail. 
 However, flexibility written in during transposition of the Directive allows the 
possibility for employers and employee representatives to negotiate their own 
information and consultation arrangements, known as pre-existing agreements (PEAs) 
when in compliance with the general principles of the directive. As long as the 
arrangements provide for the following items: 
 
• information on the recent and probable development of the undertaking’s or 
the establishment’s activities and economic situation; 
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• information and consultation on the situation, structure and probable 
development of employment within the undertaking or establishment and on 
any anticipatory measures envisaged, in particular where there is a threat to 
employment; 
• information and consultation on decisions that can lead to substantial changes 
in work organisation or in contractual relations. 
 
The scope of the directive is therefore wide and includes providing information on 
mergers and acquisitions and business reorganisations, as well as changes in terms 
and conditions of employment. (European Commission,  2006: 59) So how are the 
provisions of the Directive being applied in the UK? 
 
UK Experience of ICE 
The introduction for the first time of a statutory right to information and consultation 
has been hailed by the ETUC and British trade unions as a momentous step.  The 
transposition arrangements involving the TUC, CBI and government enabled an 
introduction of the directive on the 6th April 2005, with much interest across these 
social partners and academics about the outcomes and impact on British industrial 
relations. Many questions were raised given the flexibility written into the directive  
about the likely models and take up that would result. Gollan and Wilkinson (2007) 
argue, that whist the regulations can potentially affect and improve the British 
Industrial Relations, the current way of implementing the regulations still allow a 
scope of maintaining the voluntarist tradition albeit within a statutory framework.  
There were questions also about the role and strength of union representation given 
that “unions have been “written out of the script” as far as the standard information 
and consultation provisions are concerned” (Hall, 2006: 460)  
The period prior to the enactment of the directive had been closely watched to see if 
any voluntary movement in anticipation of the directive was in evidence.  WERs data 
was inconclusive in terms of an upsurge in information and consultation mechanisms, 
for instance Charlwood and Terry have used WERS 2004 results and argue that: 
 
“…over 80% of workplaces have no form of indirect representation, confirming 
that, to this point at least, few, if any, employers had been stimulated by the 
imminent enactment of the ICE Regulations to take pre-emptive action by 
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introducing representative consultation where none existed before. However, 
that does not mean that nothing in happening…”. (2007: 335) 
 
However, an IDS survey (2005) undertaken two years before enactment did show an 
increase in some form of consultation up from 49% to 68% with the ICE regulations 
cited as a motivating factor in this. Against this Hall (2006) quotes an ORC survey of 
66 companies in 2004 where some 55% of companies indicated their intention to do 
nothing in regard to the Directive even though only 50% of them had any appropriate 
mechanisms in place. Summarising the available evidence Hall sees the run up to 
enforcement and its immediate aftermath as something of a damp squib, with cautious 
management and uncertain union responses. 
“The available evidence suggests considerable employer-led activity in terms of 
reviewing, modifying and introducing information  and consultation 
arrangements but a relative paucity of formal ‘pre-existing agreements’, 
despite the protection they offer against the Regulations’ statutory procedures 
being invoked by employees. This picture is consistent with a ‘risk assessment’ 
rather than a ‘compliance’ approach by management, facilitated by union 
ambivalence towards the legislation and low use of its provisions by 
employees.”  (Hall,  2006: 456) 
It is difficult to give a true picture of the situation after only two years of operation as  
only now are detailed studies emerging that given some quantitative and qualitative 
picture of what is going on.  One such study commissioned by the new Department 
for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform that replaced the DTI and undertaken 
by Hall, Hutchinson, Parker Purcell and Terry (2007) looks at thirteen detailed cases 
following the enactment of the Directive. This study reports on the first stage of a 
qualitative longitudinal study.   Here they tentatively offer some early evidence, 
regarding amongst other things, the strategic usage of I&C in enterprises, the role and 
activity of the unions and the representatives, the meaningfulness of the forums in 
terms of issues and significance of the debates, and assess the importance of the 
mechanisms. Whilst the authors admit that the13 cases were in no way representative, 
they do give a glimpse at the underlying reality, in terms of formation of 
arrangements, the there was only one incidence of an agreement being made between 
the management and unions. In the remaining twelve, eight of them had PEAs and 
four were instances where management introduced arrangements on an informal 
basis. Virtually all of the running in the cases was taken by management and there 
were no trigger votes or used of the formal statutory mechanisms. In line with earlier 
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research on the setting up of EWCs the information and consultation arrangements 
fitted to some extent with the existing human resource strategies of management and 
were seen as useful adjuncts to other people development policies.  
“There is clear evidence that in all of the organisations the approach to I&C 
was strategic in the sense that it was part of a wider attempt to develop effective 
people management. The most obvious indicator of this is the near universal 
adoption of both downward and upward direct methods of involvement, seen in 
a wide array of approaches.”  (Hall et al 2007: 70) 
 
In these cases management did not see the arrangements as trivial nor did they adopt a 
passive role, however there were cases where union avoidance was uppermost. As far 
as the representatives were concerned unions did play some role but not a 
predominant one, against this the majority of representatives were voted in by secret 
ballot rather than being mere appointees. Some difficulties were observed in getting 
replacement representatives (Ibid: 72) and the authors also noted an overall lack of 
support resources for representatives across the cases. But it emerges that whilst the 
unions were active they were not using the directive and its provisions to establish a 
‘bridgehead’ for greater recognition and power in collective bargaining; “there is 
little evidence of union members ‘colonising’ the I&C bodies.” Iibid :73)   The 
authors indicate that the more worrying aspects from the report is the lack of efforts to 
build an effective network of representatives and the indifference of the rank and file 
employees:  when asked if the forums were effective between 38% and 68% of them 
said ‘what forum?’ (Ibid :73)  Summing up this early evidence on the ICE regulations 
the researchers are guarded in their evaluation counselling that the criteria for judging 
the cases should not be set high.  They are also tentative in their overall conclusions: 
“What we can say is that they (the  information and consultation arrangements), 
are in the main, not trivial; they are taken seriously by management and the 
employee representatives; they are becoming more accepted by trade unions on 
the ground; and are likely to evolve over time.(Ibid:75) 
 
With a paucity of available information as to the reality on the ground these and other 
case studies are the best indicators of the current situation regarding ICE. What they 
show so far is that the regulations have not resulted in the seismic shift  envisaged by 
some observers; Hall (2005) sees the ICE regulations as having less impact than 
EWCs in the UK for two reasons, firstly they do not demand new structures as there 
are already mechanisms in place that actors can use; secondly  the ‘minimalism’ of 
the fall back provisions and the lack of a compelling template. (Hall 2005: 123) So for 
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many observers the impact ICE may come but will be built upon the foundations that 
are only now being put into place. 
 
Discussion 
Following the Maastricht Treaty and the agreement to allow majority voting in regard 
to the social agenda the log jam surrounding worker participation reforms was broken. 
We have seen how three major Directives were developed each with significant 
structural similarities that allowed for variation in forms of participation and 
flexibility of implementation. All three place great emphasis upon a negotiation 
process that might allow the principles in the directives to be better suited to local 
arrangements; they all provide for employee representatives or special negotiating 
bodies to be centrally involved in the process and specify statutory fall-back 
arrangements that may be used in the event of disagreement or breakdown of 
negotiations.  It would seem then, from this flurry of activity surrounding worker 
consultation and participation, that this has been a period of widening and deepening 
of worker rights in Europe.  One cannot demur from the fact that there have been 
stunning developments in worker involvement that are in advance of anything to be 
found outside of Europe. However, one must see beyond the surface activity and the 
de jure level to ask if these initiatives have indeed embedded new and more effective 
forms of de facto employee involvement. This all too brief look at the three cardinal 
initiatives of the past decade offer something of a mixed picture: with some 
academics and social partners making large claims about the importance of the 
advance they represent, whilst other being highly sceptical if not downright critical of 
the overall project.   
Out of all this, one can I think detect at least three, if not more, approaches to the 
recent developments.  
The first sees these three directives as agents in building the European platform for 
extensive worker participation the European Commission, ETUI and the work of 
Lecher et al certainly fall into this category. The ICE directive complements and 
completes a project for the harmonisation of employee rights started back in the 
1960s. There is now a framework in place that provides legal rights to transnational 
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and domestic information and consultation as well as an option to provide worker 
participation on the boards of European companies.  Taken together with the social 
dialogue mechanisms at peak and sectoral level and the developments in international 
framework agreements/negotiated agreements through EWCs we can truly speak for 
the first time about a working European Social model and European industrial 
relations area. 
A second group sees the potential of these initiatives but are hesitant about the 
achievements that have come as a result. Many of the participants here stress cogent 
reasons why that advance has been so slow and halting – Marginson (2005) refers us 
to the structural complexity of European industrial relations and the ‘hole in the 
middle’ where we see ‘an absence or weakness of sector level actors and institutions’. 
(2005: 537) Much of the research emphasises the diversity and differing trajectories 
of employee participation even in the same country, highlighting also the enduring 
effects of industrial relations models, traditions and institutions and their seeming 
imperiousness to change. (Hall. 2006, 2005, Hall et al 2007) Such points act as 
reminders that a strong European space and European institutions for worker 
participation cannot be built overnight, and how the Commission and the social actors 
are involved in a complex process involving the simultaneous creation and 
legitimisation of new forms of consensual dialogue.  Often unwilling participants 
amongst the social partners have to be persuaded into the rightness of the path as one 
cannot impose participation by fiat on heterogeneous national systems and actors. 
The third approach sees is much more sceptical about the prospects for further 
advance in European worker participation. Since the Lisbon the European agenda has 
shifted decisively away from establishing and embedding worker rights and towards 
an agenda based on employment at any costs (Cressey, et al 2000). Indeed, these three 
directives could be seen to represent the completion of an old discredited pluralist 
agenda, (Weinz, 2006) one which modern social actors, especially employers, had 
little time or enthusiasm for. But the realisation of this ‘pluralism’ has been watered 
down, the experience of EWC implementation and the deficiencies highlighted by 
Waddington (2003|), Huzzard & Docherty (2005), and Hancké (2000) relate to the 
underlying weakness of the employees representatives consequent on the form of 
 19
legislation marked by a strong reliance on what Sako called “employers’ goodwill” 
(1998:12).   
In answering the question posed at the outset – has there been substantive change 
contributing to a growing Europeanisation of participative structures.  Keller (2002) 
forcefully concludes that the move towards weak forms of regulation will not 
neutralise market influence, will not enable universal rights nor will it inhibit national 
idiosyncracies. Indeed: 
“a variety of voluntaristic, tailor–made, enterprise-specific rules will be the result 
of the above mentioned proceduralisation of regulation.”  (2002: 442) 
Such developments seem to chime in with the trend towards more direct participation 
(European Foundation, 1997) in enterprises that fulfil operational and market led 
needs. The decline in the relative importance of indirect forms of representation when 
coupled with the shift towards a European form of managerialism through flexible 
regulatory mechanisms does not augur well for the creation of strong forms of worker 
participation common across member states.  Instead I would tend to concur with the 
more sceptical viewpoint that indicates not only that participation is not being 
embedded across the EU but the very model that we sought is being questioned and 
replaced by a model of participation that is functional, voluntary and unitarist in 
outlook. 
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European Works Council Directive.  Trans-national information and 
consultation rights in community scale undertakings. 94/45/EC (UK 
97/74/EC) Entry into force - 09/1996 (12/999 UK) 
 
The UK’s “opt-out” from the social chapter was formally ended when the new 
Amsterdam Treaty, incorporating the Social Chapter, entered into force on 1 May 
1999. As a result of this the original directive was extended to cover the UK in 
December 1999. 
 
• The EWC directive sets out requirements for informing and consulting 
employees at the European level in undertakings or groups of undertakings 
with at least 1000 employees across the Member States of the European 
Economic Area (EEA)3 and at least 150 employees in each of two or more of 
those Member States.  
 
• The purpose of the directive is to establish mechanisms for informing and 
consulting employees where the undertaking is so requested in writing by at 
least 100 employees or their representatives in two or more Member States, or 
on the management’s own initiative. This will entail the setting up of a 
European Works Council (or some other form of transnational information and 
consultation procedure). Where no request is received or where management 
does not initiate the process, there is no obligation to start negotiations or to 
set up an EWC. 
 
• After a request has been made (or at the management’s initiative) a negotiating 
body must be established – the “special negotiating body” (SNB). The SNB 
consists of representatives of all the employees in the EEA Member States in 
which the undertaking has operations. It is the SNB’s responsibility to 
negotiate an agreement for an EWC  with the central management of the 
undertaking (or groups of undertakings). An agreement reached under this 
procedure is known as an Article 6 agreement. 
 
• Central management and the SNB must determine the composition of the 
EWC in terms of the number of members etc; the functions and procedure for 
information and consultation; the venue, frequency and duration of EWC 
meetings; the financial and material resources to be allocated to the EWC; and 
the duration of the agreement and the procedure for its renegotiation. 
 
•  If management refuses to negotiate within six months of receiving a request 
for an EWC, or if the parties fail to conclude an agreement within three years, 
an EWC must be set up in accordance with the statutory model set out in the 
Annex to the directive. This lays out requirements concerning the size, 
establishment and operation of a European Works Council.  
 
• An annex lists topics on which the European Works Council has the right to be 
informed and consulted  
The economic and financial situation of the business;  
Its likely development;  
Probable  employment trends;  
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The introduction of new working methods;  
Substantial organisational changes  
 
  
• The Directive provides for two kinds of EWC agreement, Article 6 agreements 
as referred to above, and Article 13 agreements. The latter agreements are 
exempt from the provisions of the EWC directive if they provide for 
transnational information and consultation of the employees across the entire 
workforce in the EEA.  
 
The Transnational Information and Consultation of Employees Regulations 1999 
 
The UK i regulations are based closely on the Directive. The main features of the UK 
legislation are: 
 
• Employees or their representatives must make a valid request to 
management to negotiate an EWC. 
• A Special Negotiating Body representative of all employees must be set up to 
negotiate with management. 
• Management has 6 months from the request to commence negotiations. If it 
fails to do so, the provisions of the Schedule (which sets out the statutory 
model) apply. 
• The parties have 3 years from the request to conclude a written agreement 
establishing an EWC or alternative information and consultation procedures. If 
they fail, the provisions of the Schedule apply. The agreement must cover all 
European Economic Area establishments at least. 
• The Schedule, which applies in the absence of an agreement, sets out the 
composition of the EWC and how members are to be appointed, and provides 
for annual meetings plus exceptional meetings where required. 
• Complaints about a failure to establish an EWC or Information and 
Consultation procedure, or about the operation of an EWC or Information and 
Consultation procedure, are made to the Employment Appeal Tribunal(EAT). 
• Breaches of an Article 6 agreement or of the standard rules are liable to 
apenalty of up to £75,000. 
• Management may withhold confidential information from employee 
representatives or require them to hold it in confidence. 
• Where the CAC or EAT considers an application or complaint could be 
  settled by conciliation, it must refer the dispute to ACAS which must try to 
promote a settlement. 
• The employees and SNB/EWC members are given statutory protections 
when claiming their rights or performing duties under the Regulations. 
• The Regulations do not apply to agreements that were drawn up before 
the legislation came into effect and which cover the entire EEA workforce and  
provide for transnational Information and Consultation. 
Source.(BERR. 2003)  
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file20023.pdf 
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Directive on employee involvement in the European Company, 
obligatory employee involvement: information consultation and 
participation rights. SE 2001/86/EC Entry into force 10/2004.  
The main provisions on worker involvement in European Companies are as follows. 
? SEs may be set up by two or more EU-based companies from different 
Member States (or with operations in another Member State, in some cases) 
by merger, or by creation of a joint holding company or subsidiary. A single 
EU-based company may transform itself into an SE, if for at least two years it 
has had a subsidiary governed by the law of another Member State. A 
company based outside the EU may (if individual Member States so decide) 
participate in the formation of an SE, provided that it is formed under the law 
of a Member State, has its registered office in that Member State and has 'a 
real and continuous link' with a Member State's economy.  
? Employee involvement arrangements – information and consultation, along 
with board-level employee participation in some circumstances – must 
generally apply in all types of SE (though some aspects differ according to the 
way the SE was created).  
? Companies participating in the formation of an SE must hold negotiations over 
the employee involvement arrangements with a special negotiating body 
(SNB) made up of employee representatives. The SNB is composed of elected 
or appointed members, with seats allocated in proportion to the number of 
employees employed in each Member State by the participating companies. 
The basic rule is that Member States have one seat for every 10%, or fraction 
thereof, of the total EU workforce of the participating companies employed 
there.  
? The negotiations should lead to a written agreement on the employee 
involvement arrangements. If these arrangements involve a reduction of 
existing board-level participation rights which cover a certain proportion of 
employees (25% of the total workforce of the participating companies in the 
case of SEs established by merger, and 50% in the case of SEs established by 
creating a holding company or subsidiary), this must be approved by a special 
two-thirds majority of SNB members (from at least two Member States).  
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? The SNB may decide (again by a special two-thirds majority) not to open 
talks, or to terminate talks in progress – in which case existing national 
information and consultation rules (including those transposing the European 
Works Councils Directive (94/45/EC) will apply.  
? Where the SNB and management reach an agreement, this should essentially 
set up a 'representative body' (RB) similar to a European Works Council 
(EWC) or an information and consultation procedure. If the parties so decide 
(and compulsorily in some cases), the agreement may also set out the rules for 
board-level participation. In SEs established by transformation, the agreement 
must provide for at least the same level of all elements of employee 
involvement as existing within the company to be transformed.  
? SNB negotiations must be completed within six months, which may be 
extended to a total of one year by agreement. If no agreement is reached, or 
the parties so decide, a statutory set of 'standard rules' will apply, providing for 
a standard RB – similar to the statutory EWC laid down in the EWCs 
Directive's subsidiary requirements. The standard rules also provide for board-
level participation in certain circumstances where this existed in the 
participating companies.  
? The Directive also lays down rules on issues such as confidentiality, protection 
of employee representatives, its relationship with other provisions and 
compliance.  (Source EIRO 2002) 
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Information and Consultation Directive. National minimum standards for 
information and consultation rights of employees. 2002/14/EC  - entry 
into force 04/2005. 
? ICE Regulations apply initially to undertakings with 150 or more employees, 
but will be extended in two further stages to cover undertakings with at least 
100 employees (from April 2007) and then those with at least 50 (from April 
2008).  
? An ‘undertaking’ is defined (Regulation 2) as ‘a public or private undertaking 
carrying out an economic activity, whether or not operating for gain’,  a 
formula which excludes some parts of the public sector.  
? Employees’ rights to information and consultation under the legislation do not 
apply automatically. Regulation 7 enables 10 per cent of an undertaking’   
employees  (subject to a minimum of 15 employees and a maximum of 2,500) 
to trigger negotiations on an information and consultation agreement, to be 
conducted according to statutory procedures.  Management too may start the 
negotiation process on its own initiative (Regulation 11). 
? If there is a Previously Existing Arrangement (PEA) in place, and a request for 
negotiations is made by fewer than 40 per cent of the workforce, the employer 
can ballot the workforce on whether they support the request for new 
negotiations. If the request is endorsed by at least 40 per cent of the workforce, 
and the majority of those voting, negotiations must proceed. PEAs are defined 
as written agreements that cover all the employees of the undertaking, have 
been approved by the employees and set out ‘how the employer is to give 
information to the employees or their representatives and to seek their views 
on such information’ (Regulation 8).  
? Where a PEA covers employees in more than one undertaking, the 
employer(s) may hold a single ballot across the relevant undertakings 
(Regulation 9). 
? Where triggered under the Regulations, negotiations on an information and 
consultation agreement must take place between the employer and 
representatives elected or appointed by the workforce (Regulation 14).  
? The resulting agreement must cover all employees of the undertaking and set 
out the circumstances in which employees will be informed and consulted—
either through employee representatives or directly (Regulation 16). 
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? Where the employer fails to enter into negotiations, or where the parties do not 
reach a negotiated agreement within six months,  standard information and 
Interim assessment of the ICE Regulations 459 consultation provisions 
specified by the Regulations will apply (Regulations 18–20).  
? These require the employer to inform/consult elected employee ‘information 
and consultation representatives’ on business developments (information 
only), employment trends (information and consultation) and changes in work 
organisation or contractual relations, including redundancies and business 
transfers (information and consultation ‘with a view to reaching agreement’). 
The standard information and consultation provisions are confined to 
specifying the election arrangements for the information and consultation 
representatives and the number of such representatives to be elected (a sliding 
scale from 2 to 25 depending on the size of the workforce).  
?  The Regulations’ enforcement and confidentiality provisions apply to 
negotiated agreements reached under the statutory procedure or where the 
standard information and consultation provisions are in operation, but not to 
PEAs. Enforcement of the terms of negotiated agreements or of the standard 
information and consultation provisions will be via complaints to the Central 
Arbitration Committee (CAC), which may order the employer to take the 
necessary steps to comply with the agreement/ standard provisions 
(Regulation 22). The Employment Appeal Tribunal will hear appeals and is 
responsible for issuing penalty notices. The maximum penalty payable by 
employers for non-compliance is £75,000 (Regulation 23).   
? Employee representatives must not disclose information or documents 
designated by the employer as confidential, and employers may withhold 
information or documents the disclosure of which could seriously harm or 
prejudice the undertaking. Disputes over employers’ decisions to impose 
confidentiality restrictions or withhold information may be referred to the 
CAC (Regulations 25 and 26).  
(Source Hall 2006) 
 
 
                                                 
1 They also use the categories devised by the  SEEUROPE network  with four categories of SE: 
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‘normal’ SEs- ave both operations and employees, ‘empty’ SEs- with operations but no employee, ‘shelf’ SEs -  
with neither operations nor employees and unidentifiable or ‘UFO’ SEs. 
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